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ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

JUDSON A. SAMUELS*

During the period under survey, no significant changes have been
made in the administrativc process either by the Florida Legislature or
the Florida Supreme Court. However, a few statutes have been enacted
which are worthy of note and a few decisions have been rendered by the
supreme court which reflect interesting applications of settled principles
of law to particular factual situations.
Assistant Secretary of State.-In 1951,' the Florida Legislature abolished
the office of Assistant Secretary of State, which action, from all surrounding
circumstances, has been long overdue. The office of the Assistant Secretary
of State was authorized by virtue of statute enacted in 1927 and was
contingent for its creation upon the voluntary act exercised by the
Secretary of State. According to this provision, the Secretary of State
had the right to appoint an assistant to carry out his office whenever lie
contemplated being absent from the state capitol. In the event of such
apointment the Secretary of State was completely and solely responsible
for the compensation to which his assistant was entitled. This statute as
constituted gave rise to the possibility of many abuses and inequities.
For example, first it permitted a person selected by an appointive official
to act in the high office of Secretary of State. This result has the necessary
effect of removing a high official an additional step from the people.
Second, this statute permitted a division of loyalty since the responsibilit,
for the Assistant's compensation was placed upon the Secretary himself.
It cannot be contested that a person's natural reaction is to be completely
loyal to the person who is responsible for both his employment and
compensation. When applied to the office of Assistant Secretary of State
it encouraged primary loyalty to the Secretary which under certain
circumstances could have been detrimental to the public. It thus appears
that the abolition of the office of Assistant Secretary of State, as it was
constituted, was justified in the light of surrounding circumstances.
State Planning Board.-By virtue of statute enacted in 1935 2 a State
Planning Board was established for the purpose of effectuating greater
efficiency through the planning and coordination of the state's economic
resources.

The

Board's primary

function

was to

advise and assist

administrative agencies as well as the State Legislature in adopting methods
and laws designed to protect the state's resources from waste due to
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inefficiency or short-sightedness, Although the basis for the Board's
establishment was commendable it apparently did not function as
contemplated by its creators since it was abolished by the 1951 Legislature.3
One reason justifying its abolition was apparently its complete lack of
authority to either impose its findings or carry out its conclusions based
upon research and study. An additional reason which apparently justifies
its abolition was the vastness of its purpose and the lack of concentration.
When one considers the large number of administrative agencies in the
State of Florida and the attempt of a single board to coordinate the
activities of the agencies with a view to creating greater efficiency and
avoiding waste, it is very easy to envision results which would not have
been contemplated. Under such circumstances, however, how could a
board with no authority aside from the right to investigate and report
findings function properly?
Disqualifications of administrative board members.-Since June 9,
1951, 4 any member of an administrative agency in the State of Florida
authorized to exercise judicial functions is subject to disqualification
because of bias, prejudice, interest, or other causes which affect the fairness
of administrative hearings. In the event of the disqualification of an
administrative board member the Governor is authorized to appoint a
circuit court judge to serve temporarily in the proceedings for which the
commissioner was disqualified. This statute as enacted applies with equal
force to both elected and appointed commissioners. Expressly excluded
from the operation of the statute are the State Insurance Commissioner
and the Commissioner of Agriculture. The effect of the statute as is
evidenced by its terms is to assure by additional safeguard proper and
fair administrative hearings. Administrative hearings of a judicial nature
are made more alikened to judicial hearings and properly so since both
have similar characteristics and have essentially the same effect. Prior
to this statutory provision it was generally held that the fact that a
commissioner of an administrative tribunal may be prejudiced is not in
and of itself sufficient cause to overthrow an administrative ruling in
the absence of a clear showing that the hearing itself was unfair. This
holding placed an undue disadvantage upon the aggrieved party since it
was virtually impossible for him to show unfairness of a hearing through
bias of a commissioner. Since bias is a sufficient basis for disqualification
of a judicial officer there is no reason or justification in drawing a
distinction between a judicial proceeding and an administrative proceeding
of a judicial nature. It thus appears that although a distinction once
existed in Florida it has now been properly dispelled.
Regulatory administrative boards.-Although Florida does not as yet
have a general administrative procedure act, it appears that a step in
3. FLA. STAT. § 419 (1951).

1. FtA. STAT. § 120.09 (1951).
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that direction has been taken by the 1953 Legislature wich enacted a
statute creating greater uniformity among minor administrative tribunals.6
The statute undertakes to establish a uniform system of compensation
and per diem for board members included within its provisions and to
require the deposit of all funds received by the board into the State
Agencies' Fund. All members of the board are accorded compensation
at the rate of $10.00 per day while attending official board meetings and
are limited to a total compensation of $120.00 per year excluding per
diem and mileage. The secretary of the board is accorded an annual
salary of $1200.00 per year excluding the necessary travel expenses in the
conduct of official business. The inevitable effect of this statute is to
classify administrative agencies based upon the amount of services which
they are expected to extend and to create uniformity insofar as it is
permitted among those similarly situated.
Administrative board to handle dead bodies.-Apparently motivated
by the creation of a medical school at the University of Miami and in
contemplation of the formation of other medical schools in the State
of Florida, the Legislature did in 1953 enact a statute? establishing an
Anatomical Board whose members shall consist of the heads of departments
of Anatomy, Pathology and Surgery of the Florida Medical Association
and the Secretary of the State Board of Health. The Anatomical Board
thus created is placed in charge of all unclaimed dead human bodies or
those which must be buried at public expense. The board is directed
to distribute the bodies proportionately among the medical and dental
schools of the State of Florida for the purpose of anatomical studies only.
The statute expressly precludes the board from purchasing any bodies,
however, it does permit the board to accept bodies which are left to it
by the provisions contained in a will.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.-Several interesting cases
concerning the administrative process have confronted the Florida Supreme
Court within the last few years and although these cases have resulted
in the pronouncement of well established principles of law, the application
of these principles to the facts presented is of considerable interest. For
example, in the case of De Carlo v. West Miami,8 the Florida Supreme
Court was confronted with the problem of exhausting administrative
5. Fla. Laws 1953, e. 28215.
6. Board of Accountancy, Board of Architecture, Barbers Sanitary Commission,
Board of Basic Sciences Examiners, Beauty Culture Board, Board of Chiropody Examiners,
Board of Chiropractic Examiners, Board of Dental Examiners, Board of Engineer Examiners,
Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, Board of Law Examiners, Board of Massage,
Board of Medical Examiners, Board of Medical Technology, Milk Commission, Board
of Naturopathic Examiners, Board of Nurses Registration and Nurses Education, Board
of Dispensing Opticians, Board of Optometry, Board of Osteopathic Examiners, Board
of Pharmacy, Real Estate Commission, Land Surveyors, Board of Veterinary Examiners.
7. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28163.
8. 49 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1950).
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remedies before seeking judicial relief. InI that case the ower court
sustained a motion to dismiss filed against thc bill of complaint which
alleged that a zoning ordinance was invalid since it denied the plaintiff
of her right to enjoy property as guaranteed by the federal and state
constitutions. In sustaining the motion to dismiss, the lower court
accepted the view that the complaint was without equity and that it was
fatally defective in failing to allege that the plaintiff had exhausted the
admnistrative remedies available to her. This holdng was based upon the
fact that under the ordinance in issue, the plaintiff had the right to
appeal to the Town Council for a variance or exemption to the zoning
restrictions as imposed by the ordinance, however, she failed to do so.
The Florida Supreme Court, with two justices dissenting,9 sustained the
holding of the lower court on the ground that judicial relief is available
from a decision rendered by an administrative tribunal only after the
administrative remedies have been fully exhausted. In his dissenting
opinion' 0 Justice Chapman held steadfast to the position that where the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is in issue there is no requirement
for the exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial
relief since the issue is not determinable by an administrative agency but
is exclusively within the jurisdicton of the courts. In the words of
Justice Chapman,'
We know of no authority which may be construed as granting
power to a municipality to adjudicate the constitutionality of
its own ordinance.
The effect of Justice Chapman's opinion in the De Carlo case becamc
2
evident one year later in the case of Miami Beaeh v. 'errell.t In that
case, the appellee desired to use premises, which he leased, for the purpose
of conducting auction sales of jewelry, paintings, tapestries and like
articles. In order to assert his right to do so the appellee brought an
action for declaratory decree and injunction on the ground that the
restrictions imposed by an ordinance preventing him from doing so were
unreasonable and arbitrary and resulted in the segregation of a legitimate
business to an undesirable section of Miami Beach. 'The lower court
sustained the appellee's contention in dehouncing the ordinance insofar
as it regulated auction sales and issued an injunction against Miami Beach
from enforcing the ordinance against the plaintiff. On appeal the appellant
city raised the objection for the first time that the plaintiff below did
not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint for
declaratory decree. In support of its contention the appellant city cited

9. Justices Chapman and Terrell.
10. 49 So.2d 596, 597 (Fla. 1950).
11. Ibid.
12. 52 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1951).
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the De Carlo case. Brushing aside the objection that the issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was first raised on appeal, the
Supreme Court embarked upon the course of distinguishing the De Carlo
case from that presented on the ground that in the De Carlo case the
allegations of invalidity related to the plaintiff alone and not to the
ordinance in toto. In affirming the lower court's holding denouncing the
ordinance, the Supreme Court declared:
*

. . in the De Carlo case, the plaintiff contended that a zoning

ordinance insofar as it affected and operated against her own
particular property was unreasonable and arbitrary, and we hold
that, in order to afford the administrative authorities an opportunity
to adjust at the local level, any inequalities resulting from the
enforcement of a zoning ordinance, the plaintiff should have
exhausted her administrative remedies before seeking relief in the
courts. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff did not limit
the attack on the ordinace to its effect on his own particular
property, he made a general attack on the validity of the
ordinance, ....

13

It thus appears that where the validity of an ordinance is attacked in
toto, it is not essential to first exhaust administrative remedies beforc
resorting to the courts, however, where the complainant attacks only
the validity of an ordinance as it applies to him, administrative remedies
must first be exhausted before resorting to judicial relief.
Certiorari.-Thescope of certiorari from an order of an administrative
tribunal confronted the Florida Supreme Court in the case of Pensacola

v. Maxwell. 4 In that case the plaintiff was dismissed by a Civil Service
Board upon the finding that lie attempted to extort money. On certiorari
from the order of a Civil Service Board, the circuit court reweighed the
evidence and determined that the preponderance lay in favor of the
plaintiff thereby reversing the Board's ruling. The lower court felt it
mandatory to rewcigh the evidence by virtue of language used by the
Supreme Court in the case of Lorenzo v. Murphy.15 In that case the
Supreme Court apparently subscribed to the view quoted from Crandall's
Common Law Practice, as follows:
Certiorari is not limited to an inquiry as to jurisdiction but
extends to the manner in which that jurisdiction is exercised.
It does not review questions of fact, yet the court may, on
certiorari, examine the evidence and determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to justify the finding of the inferior court
and such, it is submitted, has been the practice of the Supreme
Court of this State, not withstanding its averments to the
contrary.' 6
13. Id. at 907.
14. 49 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1950).
15. 159 Fla, 639, 32 So.2d 421 (1947).
16. CRANDALL, COMMON LAW PRACTICi? 654 (1928).
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In overruling the action of the circuit court, the Supreme Court took
the position that certiorari from an order of the Civil Service Board
should be limited to inspection of the record for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not the Board proceeded within the authority conferred upon
it by law. It took exception to the lower court's intcrpretation of its
own decision in the Lorenzo case and in an unanimous decision declared:
We cannot agree that the cases relied on by the trial judge
for the entry of its order authorized or required the court in
certiorari proceedings to reweigh the evidence adduced before the
tribunal whose ruling is sought to be reviewed for the purpose of
determining where the preponderance lies. If such has been the
construction placed upon the cited cases we do not hesitate to say
that no such holding was intended. 1

17. 49 So,2d 527, 528-529 (Fla. 1950).

